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Urban conflict and royal
authority: popular revolts in
sixteenth-century Troyes
PENNY ROBERTS
Dept of History, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL
abstract: This paper explores the relative balance between socio-economic
grievance and confessional andpolitical division in urban revolts during the period
of the French religious wars. More particularly, it focuses on two such incidents
in the town of Troyes in Champagne in the summer of 1586 and what they can
tell us about the inﬂuence of popular discontent on municipal politics and town–
crown relations, as well as the impact of civil war, subsistence crisis and increasing
taxation on urban communities. The continuity of the traditions of popular revolt
are explored alongside the implications for royal authority of the ofﬁcial response to
such unrest. Social tensions and economic concerns dominated events in the town,
whilst the crown’s right and ability to enforce its will continued to be accepted
and upheld. Thus, despite the disruption of civil strife, the competing interests
of the municipal authorities, the urban populace and the monarchy were able to
maintain a delicate equilibrium through the traditional mechanism of negotiation
and compromise.
During the French religious wars (1562–98), relations between the French
crown and the principal towns of the kingdom were simultaneously
conciliatory and fraught. On the one hand, the relationship was symbiotic.
The king looked to the municipal authorities to preserve law and order
and harmonious relations between the faiths within their jurisdiction;
the authorities looked to the king for guidance on these issues, as well
as protection from the detrimental effects of civil strife.1 On the other
hand, there was disagreement about certain aspects of royal religious
and ﬁscal policy and their consequences. In particular, as the Catholic
League garnered increasing support after Henry of Navarre, leader
of the Protestants, became heir to the French throne in 1584, so the
crown became more wary of the continuing loyalty of France’s urban
communities. The adherence of many of the kingdom’s towns to the
1 Cf. H.J. Bernstein, Between Crown and Community: Politics and Civic Culture in Sixteenth-
Century Poitiers (Ithaca and London, 2004), 16, ‘Urban political life in France existed only
in constant reference to royal authority’, also on this theme, see 270–5. Annette Finley-
Croswhite, Henry IV and the Towns: The Pursuit of Legitimacy in French Urban Society, 1589–
1610 (Cambridge, 1999), 5, refers to the traditional ‘alliance and dialogue between crown
and towns’ of the Renaissance monarchy, see also 9 and 184.
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League from the late 1580s posed a signiﬁcant challenge to royal power and
subsequently to the succession of Henry IV (1589–1610). It is unsurprising,
therefore, that historians have tended to link these events with earlier
demonstrations of popular discontent. The increasing ﬁscal pressures of
the 1570s and 1580s, during the reign of Henry III (1574–89), exacerbated
tense relations between towndwellers and royal tax-collectors resulting in
localized unrest. Subsistence crisis heightened the concerns of the lower
orders, the menu peuple, erupting in public protest on the streets. Whilst
recognizing the traditional motivations of such outbreaks, Denis Crouzet
and others have postulated that they fed into the political divisions of the
elites between Leaguer and Royalist.2 The context of individual towns’
experience of revolt during this period can allow us to assess more
clearly the relative balance of political and socio-economic factors in the
grievances of ordinary urban inhabitants at this time.
The century 1560–1660 has long been recognized as an especially
turbulent period for popular unrest in Europe. However, historians of
early modern France have tended to treat the major outbreaks, those of the
1580s to 1590s and 1630s, in isolation one from another and, as a result,
drawnquite separate conclusions about theirmotivation and organization.
In addition, until their systematic study by William Beik, French urban
revolts were something of a poor relation to their rural counterparts which
have attracted the majority of in-depth studies.3 The unrest of the 1580s is
often portrayed as part of a nationwide discontent with political weakness
at the centre, the increased burden of taxation at a time of economic crisis
and the need for a strong Catholic reaction in the face of a resurgent
Protestantism. In this way, these revolts are seen to have threatened the
position of the French monarchy itself, whereas the disturbances of the
1630s, though again a reaction against the ﬁscal pressure brought to bear
by the burden of royal taxation, are seen asmore localized and provincially
based, and ultimately a failure when confronted by the inexorable drive
towards centralization. Of course, the provincial nature of these revolts has
long been recognized as a natural and effective means for the participants
to achieve their aims, however limited these might now appear. Yet much
2 Denis Crouzet, Les guerriers de dieu. La violence au temps des troubles de religion, vers 1525 – vers
1610, 2 vols. (Paris, 1990), vol. II, 267. As also argued by J.R. Farr, Hands of Honor: Artisans
and their World in Dijon, 1550–1650 (Ithaca and London, 1988), 198.
3 William Beik, Urban Protest in Seventeenth-Century France: The Culture of Retribution
(Cambridge, 1997), includes a brief discussion of the events in Troyes in 1586 (54–7), and is
a notable exception in addressing the continuity of revolt over the period. Among the few
in-depth studies of instances of urban revolt in the period, is E. Le Roy Ladurie, Le carnaval
de Romans. De la Chandeleur au mercredi des Cendres, 1579–1580 (Paris, 1979; translated by
M. Feeney as Carnival in Romans (New York, 1979)), though it also addresses the rural
dimension, see esp. 360. Notably, too, Y.-M. Berce´ dealt with urban as well as rural revolts
in his monumental Histoire des croquants: e´tude des soule`vements populaires au XVIIe sie`cle dans
le sud-ouest de la France, 2 vols. (Geneva, 1974), though discussion of these is much reduced
in the abridged version of the English translation byA.Whitmore,History of Peasant Revolts:
The Social Origins of Rebellion in Early Modern France (Cambridge, 1990); so, too, did Rene´
Pillorget in Les mouvements insurrectionnels de Provence entre 1596 et 1715 (Paris, 1975).
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of the unrest of the 1580s (aside from the League revolt itself) was arguably
just as conservative and localized, and, faced by such forms of deﬁance,
the crown proved itself to be far from impotent.
One of the main reasons for drawing these chronological distinctions
is that sixteenth-century French revolts are usually seen in the context
of the religious wars as mere extensions of the divisions caused by the
conﬂict.4 Someyears ago,NatalieDavis delineated the differences between
religious riots and socio-economic revolts, arguing convincingly that they
involved different motivations, targets and actions appropriate to the
grievance held.5 Although this approach appears valid enough for the
confessional conﬂicts of the 1560s and 1570s, the same cannot be said for
the revolts at the time of the League, which cannot be so easily extricated
from the customary expressions of socio-economic discontent. In addition,
the view that they were linked to political intrigue has tended to set
them apart from those popular uprisings that came before and after and,
therefore, from a tradition of revolt. However, contrary to the thesis that
revolts during the latter decades of the wars reﬂected the growing political
tensionbetween the crownand theCatholic League, on closer investigation
such unrest appears rather to reveal traditional and localized economic
concerns. Recentwork has highlighted the importance for town authorities
of maintaining popular support as well as the role of popular inﬂuence
on urban politics through protest. Relations between municipal ofﬁcials
and urban inhabitants were never easy or equally balanced, sometimes
proving openly hostile, and always depended on negotiation, especially at
times of particular crisis.6 Furthermore, the crown’s response to popular
protest demonstrates its continuing ability to assert its authority in the
face of potential disobedience withins its urban communities, despite the
disruption caused by civil strife. Such a case can be made by focusing on
the unrestwhich broke out in the streets of the city of Troyes inChampagne
in 1586, at the height of the religious wars and just prior to the ascendancy
of the League in the town in 1588.
Two separate revolts took place during the classic period of protest, late
spring and summer. Subsistence riots often occurred when the effects of
a poor harvest and the subsequent high price of foodstuffs were most
acutely felt and it became clear that the next harvest promised little better,
whilst anti-tax protests shadowed the ﬁscal calendar, coinciding with the
4 E.g. P. Zagorin, Rebels and Rulers, 1500–1660, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1982), vol. I, 236. Henry
Heller in Iron and Blood: Civil Wars in Sixteenth-Century France (Montreal and London,
1991), whilst ﬁtting the revolts of the sixteenth century into a continuum with those of
the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, takes a determinist approach to the relationship
between popular protest and the religious wars.
5 N.Z. Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford and London, 1975), ch. 6,
‘The rites of violence’, also in Past and Present, 59 (1973); and ‘Debate: the rites of violence:
religious riot in sixteenth-century France: a rejoinder’, Past and Present, 67 (1975), esp. 131–2,
in response to Janine Garrisson’s criticism of her approach in the same volume, 127–30.
6 Beik, Urban Protest, 1, refers to these negotiations as ‘dialogues of power’, see also 13, 48,
95; Bernstein, Between Crown and Community, 15, 103–6, 191.
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distribution of warrants and the drawing up of assessment rolls.7 Both of
these inﬂammatory elements, subsistence crisis and high taxation, were
present to ignite revolt in Troyes in 1586. Much can be gleaned from such
incidents regarding the nature of relations and, indeed, tensions between
municipal and royal authorities in sixteenth-century France, as well as
the attitudes of both these bodies to the actions of discontented urban
journeymen at a time of socio-economic difﬁculty, religious upheaval and
monarchical crisis. The royal response to the unrest suggests that the
lessons of the civil wars for the crown extended beyond the more obvious
political and religious sphere to embrace practical and effective ways in
which provincial, and speciﬁcally urban, privileges could be eroded in the
interests of strengthening royal authority, a trend more usually associated
with royal policy towards the towns in the seventeenth century.8 But before
considering this wider picture, it is necessary to examine brieﬂy the events
of the summer of 1586 in Troyes, as well as assessing their causes, their
implications and ﬁnally the royal reaction to the unrest.
The ﬁrst and most serious of the protests began on Sunday 29 June,
the feast of saints Peter and Paul, to whom the city cathedral is dedicated
and which may therefore have been an annual local holiday, although
the records do not mention the feasting and other revelry which would
have taken place on such an occasion, and which preceded so many
outbreaks of popular discontent. The coincidence is nonetheless worth
noting.Awealthymerchant and alderman (e´chevin)NicolasDare, ourmain
source for the revolts and one of those charged with the responsibility of
suppressing them, terms it rather enigmatically as ‘a dangerous day’, but
this may simply refer to the events which ensued.9 The principal targets of
the protestors were two royal commissioners accompanied by their bailiffs
(huissiers) and sergeants, who had recently arrived in Troyes to enforce the
payment of a levy from certain crafts which represented the cost of two
supernumerary masterships, valued at 24 e´cus, granted by Henry III as a
gift to his sister some years before.10 It appears that the commissioners had
given the crafts only two days in which to come up with the money, and
500 craftsmen had been charged to meet the demand. If there was
7 Berce´, Histoire des Croquants, vol. II, 538–48 and 563–6, on the typology of revolt.
8 Finley-Croswhite,Henry IV and the Towns, argues against a deliberate royal policy to destroy
urban privileges, but rather a need to balance and negotiate royal authority and urban
autonomy, see esp. 1, 5, 182–6.
9 It is fortunate that Dare in his position as e´chevin was able to report fully on the revolt
in his memoirs: Me´moires et livre de famille de Nicolas Dare, ed. B. de Barberey and R. de
St-Mauris in Collection de documents ine´dits relatifs a` la ville de Troyes et a` la Champagne
me´ridionale publie´s par la Socie´te´ acade´mique de l’Aube, vol. III (Troyes, 1886) (hereafter Dare),
50, ‘ung jour dangereux’. The two revolts are covered in detail in the memoirs, 49–62. Beik,
Urban Protest, emphasizes rather that it was Sunday, ‘a day of rest when they were free to
confer and organize’, 54.
10 The original royal demand is found inActes royaux, jan.–mars 1580, Bibliothe`queNationale,
Paris (hereafter BN) Imprime´s, F 46864, no. 1, ‘Edict de la creation de deux maistrises en
chacun mestier, qui seront receuz sans chef-d’oeuvre, en faveur de la royne de Navarre’.
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any further delay, they threatened, then each of the crafts would be
charged a further 8 e´cus to cover the expense of prolonging their stay.11
The provocative nature of this approach is clear, and suggests that the
commissionersmay have already experienced resistance to their demands,
in Troyes or elsewhere. Alternatively, they may simply have wanted to
collect the levy as quickly as possible so that they could move on.
By 10 o’clock on the Sunday morning popular agitation had begun in
the streets. Doubtless keen to prevent the trouble from escalating and
apparently sympathetic with the protestors’ grievances if not with their
means of remedying them, Nicolas Dare and his fellow-e´chevin Louis
de Villeprouve´e, accompanied by the royal pre´voˆt, Nicolas Jaquot, went
to remonstrate with the commissioners over the size of the levy which
appeared much inﬂated since the original demand. They reasoned that the
people were impoverished because of the high price of grain during the
last year, that there was a shortage of work for local craftsmen, and thus
great resentment was felt towards this further imposition on their meagre
resources. The commissioners were advised to leave for their own safety;
just one of their number was to remain to approach the crafts one-by-one
with the authority of the citymagistrate. Nevertheless, despite the ofﬁcials’
advice, the commissionerswerenot to be so easilydeterred at this stage and
declared that they were well able to defend themselves with the ﬁrearms
they had to hand. Having tried in vain to defuse the situation and avoid a
confrontation, the ofﬁcials withdrew and left the royal representatives to
face the wrath of the people.
After vespers a crowd began to assemble outside the commissioners’
lodgings in the rue de Croncels, and by 7 o’clock there were said to be
nearly 800 poor people, men, women and children, gathered outside. The
local ofﬁcials attempted once again to intervene and disperse the crowd,
but were themselves forced to retreat as the numbers grew. The protestors
then broke into the lodging, seized and beat one of the bailiffswho, in order
to save his life, revealed the names of those who had been responsible for
summoning (‘qui les avoient faict venir’) the commissioners to Troyes.12
He was then dragged to the house of one of those he had betrayed –
Raguin, clerk of the district or bailliage – and was murdered; the house
was pillaged and papers found within were burned. At this point the local
militia broke up the riot.
At midnight, the remaining commissioners, now rather less deﬁant,
were escorted by the militia out of the city gate of La Madeleine to a place
of safety nearby. However, calm was only brieﬂy restored. By 4 o’clock in
the morning the people were reconvening with the intention of attacking
11 Dare, 49–50.
12 Beik, Urban Protest, 55, refers to these men as ‘local ﬁnancial backers’, but Dare, 51, is much
vaguer about their connections with the tax-collectors. Pierre de L’Estoile, Registre-journal
du re`gne de Henri III, ed. Madeleine Lazard and Gilbert Schrenck, vol. V (1585–87) (Geneva,
2001), 190, simply states that they were ‘mixed up’ with them: ‘qui se meˆlaient de telles
maletoˆtes’.
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the houses of the other collaborators named by the murdered bailiff. This
time the local militia refused to act to defend the tax-collectors and the
properties were duly pillaged. It was then that a self-styled leader of the
revolt emerged, a poor weaver who was reported to have said, ‘We need a
captain; if youwant it to beme lookatwhat I amcarryingonmyshoulder; it
is a fork, call me Captain Fork.’13 Hostile commentators claimed that most
of those who followed the captain were children (enfans) aged between 7
and 15, armed only with stones.14 Yet, from this unpropitious beginning,
Captain Fork’s band was to prove more of a threat to civic order than any
of the unrest that had gone before.
The protestors now turned their attention to several rich citizens’ houses
in the vicinity. Although initially driven away by the neighbours of most
of those they had targeted, the rioters faced no opposition in breaking
into and pillaging the house of Nicolas Largentier, merchant and captain
of the district militia. Whatever the reasons for the failure to defend his
residence, it was a potentially dangerous development since the house
acted as a munition store for the city containing, it was claimed, enough
weapons and ammunition to arm 500 men, and was located not far from
the Croncels gate which housed the royal gunpowder store. Whether as a
result of the increasing volatility of the situation or the emerging threat to
civic security, the authorities now took more concerted action to quell the
unrest.
The revolt was ﬁnally ended by the intervention of 200 armed bourgeois
under the command of two local ofﬁcials, in lieu of the reluctant regular
militia. 2 of the rioters were killed on the spot and 80 injured, 30 of
whom died within the next few days. In the afternoon, the ofﬁcials
carried out a search of the poorer inhabitants, making a further 32 arrests
and recovering most of Largentier’s property. Next day, Tuesday 1 July,
the royal representative in the province, Lieutenant-Governor Dinteville,
arrived with his entourage having been informed of the sedition. By his
order, on the Wednesday night, Captain Fork and his wife and two other
leaders were arrested, and the following night hanged in the prisons,
presumably to avoid reactivating the unrest as a public execution might
have done, whilst a deterrent was provided by the displaying of the bodies
on gallows outside the town. Most of the other prisoners were released,
except ﬁve who were detained to await the royal will. From the ﬁrst act
of deﬁance to the arrest of the ringleaders, the revolt had lasted less than
four days.
13 Dare, 51: ‘Il nous fault ung capitaine; si voulez que je le sois regardez que c’est que je porte
sur mon espaulle; c’est une fourche, nomme´s moy le capitaine La Fourche.’
14 On the involvement of children in confrontations during the religious wars, see Crouzet,
Les guerriers de dieu, vol. I, 76–91; Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France, 183–
4; Wolfgang Kaiser, Marseille au temps des troubles, 1559–1596 (Paris, 1992), 202–4; and
speciﬁcally on Troyes, Penny Roberts, A City in Conﬂict: Troyes during the French Wars of
Religion (Manchester, 1996), 46 and 85.
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However, this was not to be the end of the demonstrations of discontent
in Troyes that summer. Two months later, at the end of August, there
was a further outbreak of unrest, led by textileworkers (mostly shearers
or tondeurs) against a surcharge levied per pound of bread which they
confusingly claimed was pushing up the price of wheat and rye.15
Despite the mayor’s acceptance of their petition, the protestors proceeded
to threaten the houses where they believed grain was being hoarded,
principally those of corn-merchants and tax-collectors. In order to calm
them down, the authorities took them into several virtually empty
granaries, but they were still not appeased and demanded that corn be
sold at less than half the current value or they would break in and seize it.
The next day a group of 40–50 journeymen gathered, armed with stones
and daggers, but the night watch intervened. The following night the
protestors waited until the watch had retired at 2 a.m., and proceeded
to pillage the houses of several rich citizens, including once again that of
Nicolas Largentier, which had been barricaded since the June revolt, and of
former mayor Louis Le Mairat. However, this time, perhaps because of the
escalation in violence against private property or of the royal reprimand
they had received after the previous unrest, the authorities were swifter
to act. Lieutenant-Governor Dinteville and his men arrived that evening,
and eleven suspects were seized in their beds overnight. Six days later
they were brought to trial, but were banished rather than executed, Dare
alleges, because the judges had been threatened and may have lost their
nerve at this juncture. In general, this episode appears to have rapidly
acquired a more menacing air; Dare describes it as ‘this pernicious and
dangerous conspiracy’.16 Nevertheless, he also highlights once again the
problemswhich the journeymen faced: that they had been forced to pledge
their possessions because of the expense of grain compoundedwith a poor
grape harvest.
Thus,whilst themotives anddemands of the twooutbursts of discontent
were different, the underlying socio-economic difﬁculties which they
revealed were the same. Like wage-earners throughout Europe at this
time, the craftsmen of Troyes faced a decline in the real value of theirwages
at a time of inﬂation, underemployment and increasing numbers reliant
on poor relief. The population pressure which underlay these trends also
made the outcome of each harvest more crucial, and periodic epidemics
hit the undernourished population hard. The French religious wars of the
1560s to 1590s worsened the situation still further, resulting in a disruption
of trade, agricultural devastation and heavy royal taxation. The decades
of the 1580s and 1590s were particularly tough in northern France, but this
picture of popular immiseration and building social tensions holds good
for southern French towns too, such as Marseille, which also experienced
15 On the August protest, see Dare, 59–62, and on this speciﬁc point: ‘oster les cuisences du
pain a` la livre, disans qu’il(s) mettoient la cherte´ au bled, seigle nouvel’, 59.
16 Dare, 61: ‘ceste pernicieuse et dangereuse conpiration’.
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unrest.17 The intensiﬁcation of military activity in Champagne, following
Guise attempts in 1584–85 to capture strategic centres in the region
including Troyes, placed the city on a state of alert. In 1585, Lieutenant-
Governor Dinteville introduced a set of new regulations for municipal
defence.18 However, urgent repairs to the city’s fortiﬁcations were needed,
andDinteville suggested that the expense of thesemight be covered by the
crown foregoing a levy of 4,000 e´cus, so that the reconstruction of Troyes
would serve as an ‘example to others’.19
In October 1585, the authorities in Troyes reported shortages in grain
supplies to the provincial governor, the duke of Guise.20 The months
immediately preceding the revolts also witnessed the escalation of the
subsistence crisis in Champagne. Heavy rain ruined the grape harvest
which, in turn, inﬂated the price of wine; other crops also suffered
and restrictions were placed on the quantity of grain purchased and
passports required to take it out of the city.21 One source refers to the
containment of disturbances by the people roundabout the town at the
end of July, between the revolts, because of the shortage of wheat and
resulting famine; a rare reference to a rural dimension to the unrest.22
One measure of urban concern over the ﬂuctuating grain prices was the
decision to change the form of assessment of contributions to poor relief
from loaves of bread to money, which may have been a further source
of antagonism to the participants in the revolts.23 The outbreak of one of
the most serious plagues of the century in northern France was further
disruptive to livelihoods dependent on raw materials imported from, and
goods exported, elsewhere. Despite the authorities’ attempts to alleviate
these problems following the revolts – by doubling the contributions to
assist victims of the plague, organizing the sale of alternative grains to
wheat and the provision of work for the unemployed, as well as pleading
against the imposition of a further ‘loan’ to the crown – the hardship and
resulting tension remained.24 A fewmonths after the revolts, themunicipal
authorities appealed to the duke of Guise again regarding the need to
17 Philip Benedict, ‘Civil war and natural disaster in northern France’, in P. Clark (ed.), The
European Crisis of the 1590s (London, 1985), 84–105; Finley-Croswhite, Henry IV and the
Towns, 14–17; Kaiser, Marseille, esp. 249–57.
18 BN, Fonds Dupuy, MS 228, fos. 162–77: ‘Re`glement pour le garde et guet de Troyes’.
19 ‘Lettres de Monsieur de Dinteville, 1585–87’, Revue de Champagne et de Brie, 13 (1882), 61–2,
21 Mar. 1585: ‘et sert de miroir et d’exemple aux autres’.
20 ArchivesMunicipales de Troyes (hereafter AMTroyes), Fonds Boutiot, AA 31, liasse 1 (Ble´s,
grains – approvisionnement et commerce, 1552–1789).
21 Dare, 40 and 45; ‘Extraits d’un registre domestique de Jean Bonjour Le Jeune, notaire-
e`s-foires de Champagne a` Troyes (1531–86)’, ed. C. de Breban, Annuaire de l’Aube (1840)
(hereafter Bonjour), 65.
22 AM Troyes, Fonds Boutiot, AA 31, liasse 1, 3 Aug. 1586.
23 Dare, 47. AM Troyes, Fonds Boutiot, AA 35, liasse 1 (Aumoˆne ge´ne´rale, 1536–1614).
24 AM Troyes, Fonds Boutiot, A 22, register of town council deliberations, 29 Aug. 1586;
AA 31, liasses 1 and 5 (Vagabonds, belistres, mendicans, 1532–1700); AA 35, liasse 1;
AA 37, liasse 1 (Epidemies,maladies contagieuses, pestes, 1509–1722). ‘Lettres deMonsieur
de Dinteville’, 62.
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provide grain to feed the people and to prevent the spread of a virulent
illness which had already struck down many, both rich and poor, on top
of which the debasement of the coinage ‘angers the poor people because
of their necessity and poverty’.25
The nature of the grievances, the initial provocation, the actions of the
participants, the reactionof the authorities and theoutcomeof the revolts in
Troyes, all follow a familiar pattern. Furthermore, the trends against which
the discontented were reacting in 1586 – increases in royal expenditure,
indirect taxes and high grain prices – would continue to cause unrest in
Troyes and elsewhere well into the seventeenth century.26 However, the
peculiar circumstances of thewars undoubtedly exacerbated the economic
difﬁculties faced by the protestors, just as political struggles coloured
the authorities’ attitude towards demonstrations of popular discontent.
The citizens of Troyes had good and well-established reasons for feeling
aggrieved with the direction of royal policy by 1586. Yet these grievances
were primarily socio-economic rather than political.
In the towns, it was the craftsmen who bore the burden of the sharp
increase in royal taxes between 1576 and 1590. They were also hardest hit
by surcharges onwine, grain, ﬂour and salt, impositions resisted in 1578–79
by the estates of the northernprovinces of Brittany, Burgundy,Champagne,
Normandy and Picardy.27 The introduction of a further imposition in the
1580s, and one that was clearly unconnected with the ﬁnancing of the
war effort, in addition to the high-handed manner of its implementation,
aroused indignation which was the culmination of a long and growing
list of grievances. The warning signs were already present the previous
year, when Dinteville wrote to the king that a recent royal ﬁscal demand
would stir up the craftsmen and, ‘since they form more than three quarters
of the town’s population, they will drag the rest where their fancy takes
them without remedy’.28 The workers of Troyes had not felt the need to
protest with such force since the unemployment crises of the 1520s, when
as a result of plague the council had prohibited the import of wool and
linen with disastrous results for the drapers and paper manufacturers,
consequently causing the discontent of thousands of workers.29 In 1586
they may also have seized the opportunity offered by the absence on
business of all but three of the top city ofﬁcials to give vent to their
frustrations.
25 AM Troyes, Fonds Boutiot, AA 31, liasse 1, 28 Oct. 1586.
26 On the 1620s, Beik, Urban Protest, 85–91, and B. Porchnev, Les soule`vements populaires en
France de 1623 a` 1648 (Paris, 1963), 133 and 265; also see J.H.M. Salmon, Society in Crisis:
France in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1975), 312, on riots in 1596. Finley-Croswhite,
Henry IV and the Towns, 146–61, and Farr, Hands of Honor, 201–10, examine other early
seventeenth-century French urban revolts.
27 Farr, Hands of Honor, 201–22. BN, Fonds Dupuy, MS 87, fos. 39–43.
28 ‘Lettres de Monsieur de Dinteville’, 61: ‘comme ils forment plus des trois quarts de la
population de la ville, ils entraineroient le reste ou` la fantaisie les pousseroit sans pouvoir
d’y remedier’.
29 Heller, Iron and Blood, 28.
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The streets of the quarter of Croncels in which the protest took
place housed the richest inhabitants of that particular district of the
city, principally merchants living in or around the rue du Temple. In
contrast, a quarter of the area’s householders were classed as too poor
to pay tax. The predominant occupational group was the textileworkers,
constituting one third of the district’s inhabitants, including over half of
the city’s shearers and dyers (shearers having led the second revolt). But
more proportionately signiﬁcant were the leatherworkers, representing
a quarter of the population rather than an eighth as they did in the
city as a whole, in particular the tanners.30 This grouping of dyers and
tanners is explained by the plentiful supply of water available in this area
of the city, the result of the rerouting of the Seine through the town in
the twelfth century.31 The leatherworkers, in particular, were restricted
by the unpleasant odours resulting from their work, which caused the
authorities to designate a separate zone for them which became known
as the Tanneries. This group was further singled out by the authorities
in the plague regulations for 1586, because of the risk of disease being
carried on the animal hides with which they worked, and which they were
consequently forbidden to bring into the town.32 Such a measure may well
have further threatened their livelihood at an already difﬁcult time, whilst
the mastership tax may have seemed like the last straw, especially when
access to masterships was being increasingly restricted by the existing
masters, who were responsible for the regulation of their particular craft
group in line with Troyes’ status as a ville jure´e. It was this status, more
common than that of a ville libre such as Lyons (free of guild statutes and
the domination of the masters), which made the town’s population liable
for the levy which triggered the June revolt.33
It is tempting to speculate thatultimately theunrest reﬂectedantagonism
between the poorer and richer inhabitants of the quarter in which it took
place, but because of the lack of surviving trial records it is impossible to
establish exactly who was involved. Thus it cannot be shown, as for some
other revolts, what degree of preplanning and organization lay behind the
protest, and whether it respected parish or quarter boundaries. It may be
that the inhabitants of this area received the brunt of the commissioners’
aggression in demanding the payment because of its proximity to where
they were lodged. On the other hand it would have been easy enough
30 On these calculations for Croncels, see Roberts, A City in Conﬂict, 22 and Appendix 1,
197–9. During a search of the district following the June revolt, inhabitants complained
that the main street by the river had been ‘incommodez’ for about two years: AM Troyes,
Fonds Boutiot, A 22, 12 July.
31 E. Chapin, Les villes de foires de Champagne, Bibliothe`que de l’e´cole des hautes e´tudes,
no. 268 (Paris, 1937), 34 and 241–2.
32 AM Troyes, Fonds Boutiot, AA 37, liasse 1.
33 Farr, Hands of Honor, 16–17, 47–55, on the signiﬁcance and evolution of jure´ and libre status.
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for the discontented from the rest of the city to gather there.34 The fact
that the same wealthy individuals’ houses were targeted in both the June
and August revolts suggests a degree of organization and co-ordination,
especially in view of the opportunity to arm themselves presented by the
weapons-store kept chez Nicolas Largentier, as too does the regrouping of
the protestors when the watch came off duty.
The surviving accounts do not reveal whether the initial protest was
divided along craft lines or which trades were most affected and thus had
a vested interest in opposing the levy.35 Dare mentions the participation of
many from the villages in the countryside roundabout Troyes, suggesting
that the protest went beyond the initial provocation of the royal levy
on urban craftsmen, therefore reﬂecting more established grievances.36 It
may be that there was some rural appeal in pillaging some of the richer
inhabitants of the city who owned estates in the countryside, but there is
no evidence for attacks on rural estates such as happened aroundMarseille
in 1578–79, Romans in 1580 and Agen in 1635.37 The elusive Captain Fork,
of whom we know nothing beyond his occupation and his badge of ofﬁce
(as it were), his pitchfork, may have supplemented his income by working
in the ﬁelds; arguably, though, it was an implement equally suited to
urban use. What is clear is that poor artisans living in the city were the
most active in the revolt, judging by the ofﬁcial round-up of prisoners
and property from individual houses following the disturbances. On the
whole, therefore, it seems that the participants in the revolt were typical
of its kind: poorer citizens, journeymen, apprentices, servants – therefore
drawn from among the younger element within society and one largely
excluded from the local political power networks – as well as agricultural
workers from the suburbs and perhaps beyond.38 Dare states that many of
the participants came from nearby villages, and that none of them had any
means with the exception of a baker.39 However, the authorities usually
found it prudent to dismiss the discontented as ignorant and of little
worth, as reﬂected eventually in their account to the royal representative
to play down the seriousness of the unrest, stating notably that ‘not a single
34 Interestingly, this quarter of the town also saw much of the religious conﬂict of previous
decades, although it must be stressed that, notably in terms of participants, there appears
to be no other link to these earlier troubles. Cf. Roberts, A City in Conﬂict, 78 and 82.
35 However, a record of the amounts to be levied does survive, dated 14 Dec. 1585, although
it may bear little relation to those eventually demanded. It is nonetheless interesting in
the way it divides the crafts into ‘les meilleurs’, ‘les mediocres’ and ‘les plus petits’.
Notably, tanners, shoemakers and other leatherworkers were placed in the top category
and therefore commanded the highest levy of 20 e´cus. See BN, Imprime´s, F 46880, no. 29.
36 Dare, 54.
37 Kaiser, Marseille, 236–8; Le Roy Ladurie, Carnaval de Romans, 150, 170, 190–4, 360, 363; Beik,
Urban Protest, 66.
38 Cf. Le Roy Ladurie, Carnaval de Romans, 27–31, regarding the social breakdown of
participants; Pillorget, Mouvements insurrectionnels, 319; Finley-Croswhite, Henry IV and
the Towns, 146.
39 Dare, 54: ‘ung seul homme qui est aucun moien, si peu que ce soit’.
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master craftsman’ was involved.40 Nevertheless, fears of social subversion
also emerge from the accounts of the revolts. After the ﬁrst, the royal
pre´sident of the regional court, Eustache de Mesgrigny, declared that the
union andwelfare of the townwas dependent on themaintenance of order
by its ofﬁcials and the people’s obedience, and ‘that each inhabitant should
recognise his status’.41 Ofﬁcial concerns were reinforced by rumours that
poor craftsmen were heard to have muttered ‘that it is necessary to share
with the rich’.42 But such stories probably have as much to tell us about
the paranoia of the authorities as the concerns of the people, as we will
see.
Yet, as already indicated, the authorities were not without sympathy
both for the plight of the workers and their grievances against the actions
of the royal tax-collectors, and they were also well aware of the impending
subsistence crisis which the region faced. Even the e´chevins thought the
high price set on the masterships, said to be six times that of the original
charge, excessive. It is evident, too, that in anti-ﬁscal revolts therewas some
consensus that the kind of social climber who had bought his way into
ofﬁce that the commissioners were perceived to represent, was beneﬁting
from ill-gotten gains, lining his own pockets at the expense not only of the
people, but also of the king.43 Such a perception could result in an alliance
of the people and the authorities against the outsider and his interference
in local affairs, such as the raising of taxes.44 We see this, for example, in
the expectation that if local ofﬁcials accompanied the royal agents then the
craftsmen, used to being policed by the municipality, were more likely to
comply. Thus the protestors also turned their attention to those perceived
as traitors to the community for fraternizing with, and inviting in, the
tax-collectors. An extension of this was to go against those seen as part of
a wider evil, those whose social status or occupation involved proﬁting
from the people’s misery, in the minds of the protestors tarred with the
same brush as the gabeleurs (excisemen) or maltoˆtiers (extortioners), as they
were commonly known; Beik’s ‘culture of retribution’.45 The widespread
hostility to such individuals is reﬂected in the attitude of the local militia
who refused to protect them; a reluctance to act also shared by the
authorities. For example, Nicolas Largentier (a notorious local tax farmer
as it turns out), owner of salt granaries and involved in other surcharges
40 AM Troyes, Fonds Boutiot, A 22, 12 July 1586: ‘ny ung seul maistre des mestiers’.
41 Ibid.: ‘il estoyt besoing que chacun des habitans recognuˆt sa qualite´’; interestingly, the
president’s house seems to have been one of those targeted in the June revolt and he was
married to one of the daughters of Louis Le Mairat.
42 Dare, 61: ‘qu’il falloit fere partage avec les riches’. Cf. Farr, Hands of Honor, on similar
sentiments in Dijon in 1630, 209–10.
43 Berce´, History of Peasant Revolts, 344–5.
44 The Actes royaux also reveal that the crown had attempted on several occasions to make
the local authorities responsible for collecting the levy, evidently to no avail, suggesting
a further angle to the authorities’ reaction to this intervention, e.g. see BN, Imprime´s,
F 46880, nos. 29 and 31 (Dec. 1585), and F 46881, no. 31 (Mar. 1586).
45 Berce´, Histoire des croquants, vol. II, 581–2; Porchnev, Soule`vements populaires, 267–8.
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on wine and cloth, found that even his neighbours and servants were
not prepared to take any action to defend his house. Furthermore, his
attempts to clear his name of any association with malletostes, and his pleas
for compensation following the pillaging of his property in both revolts,
received scant sympathy from the municipal authorities who were more
interested in reprimanding him for allowing access to themunitions stored
in his house.46 It was only following the direct intervention of the king that
the issue of restitution from those responsible for the unrest was properly
addressed.47
Too great a solidarity against agents of the crown could lead to royal
suspicions that the local authorities had turned a blind eye to, if not
openly encouraged, rebellion. This was especially true at a time when
the king was politically vulnerable, and the circumstances of the wars
rendered the continuing loyalty of a city like Troyes, strategically placed
on the country’s eastern frontier, vital. The tardiness or inefﬁciency of the
municipal authorities in suppressing popular revolt was therefore seen by
the crown as a deliberate act of connivance. There are plenty of instances
of other major towns, or whole regions, in France being punished ﬁscally
or otherwise for their insubordination, even at a less sensitively charged
time. Following the revolt in Guyenne in 1548, Bordeaux’s privileges were
abolished, discontent against a sales tax in Limoges in 1602 led to the
reduction of the powers of the consulate, and protests in Dijon in 1630
resulted in a stiff reprimand and hefty indemnity for the city.48 In 1586
the municipal authorities in Troyes had to work hard in order to convince
the royal authorities that their slow response was not due to a lack of
zeal on their part, but to the cold feet of the militia; even so the city
was ﬁned 1,500 e´cus.49 Although the king acknowledged that the local
ofﬁcials had behaved ‘worthily’ (‘dignement’), he felt that they had neither
acted quickly nor forcefully enough in suppressing the revolt which, he
pointed out, was only satisfactorily achieved by the eventual arrival of his
representative, Lieutenant-Governor Dinteville.50 Indeed, it is difﬁcult to
assess, since themain account we have of the revolt is written by one of the
ofﬁcials themselves, just how active the authorities may have been behind
the scenes in fomenting discontent, but there is nothing to suggest that
46 AM Troyes, Fonds Boutiot, A 22, proce`s-verbal of Largentier, 8 July: that he had ‘oncques
mesle´ de subsides de malletostes, ny aucunement manier en toutes ses actions ains
tousjours modestement et en homme de bien ayant faire service et plaisir au public . . . ny
fait chose contre l’autorite´ du Roy’. Dare, 61 and n. 1. Beik, Urban Protest, 55–6 and n. 10,
discusses Largentier’s reputation and ﬁnancial connections.
47 BN, MS fr. 17990, fo. 108, 10 July.
48 On Guyenne, see Zagorin, Rebels and Rulers, vol. I, 239, and Salmon, Society in Crisis, 37.
On Limoges, Annette Finley-Croswhite, ‘Absolutism and municipal autonomy: Henry IV
and the 1602 Pancarte Revolt in Limoges’, in Mack P. Holt (ed.), Society and Institutions
in Early Modern France (Athens, GA, and London, 1991), 80–97. On Dijon, Farr, Hands of
Honor, 206–7.
49 Dare, 61.
50 BN, MS fr. 17990, fo. 108, 10 July; Fonds Dupuy, MS 228, fos. 235–6, 22 and 24 July.
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they were. At the same time, however, it undoubtedly suited the crown to
portray events in this manner.
Following the ﬁrst revolt, steps were taken to inform both the king and
the governor of the province, the duke of Guise, of what had happened
and the measures that had been taken to prevent any recurrence, as well as
to plead the case for rescinding the levy that had been the chief cause of the
disturbances.51 Nicolas Dare was part of the municipal delegation on this
occasion. On 5 July, the town council ordered local preachers and parish
priests to admonish those who attended their sermons to remain quiet and
refrain from any action which might rekindle the disturbances, suggesting
that the situation remained tense.52 In the council session held aweek later,
Lieutenant-Governor Dinteville remarked that ‘the greatest fault noted
had been that its inhabitants had showed themselves so reluctant to obey
the orders given to them by royal ofﬁcials’. He urged that the notables
of Troyes take heed in future of the most appropriate means by which
they might deal with such disturbances and ‘promptly extinguish the ﬁre
before it took hold’.53 The mayor, who had been absent at the time of
the revolt, blamed the local militia for failing to quell the unrest despite
instruction from royal ofﬁcials. The militia thus served as a scapegoat for
the alleged negligence of the authorities, just as it would do under similar
circumstances in the 1620s.54 However, Henry III, in a letter of 10 July,
was furious at what he saw as a personal slight on his authority, declaring
that he felt that the few deaths that had already occurred were insufﬁcient
for the gravity of the crime which had threatened ‘to totally ruin one of
the best towns in his kingdom’.55 Therefore, he ordered further trials and
some exemplary executions to deter any further opposition, and directed
that the rebels should provide compensation to those who had suffered
at their hands. He also demanded that the ﬁndings of any investigations
into the incident be reported directly to him in his council. In response, the
town ofﬁcials andDinteville requested that the king forgo his demands for
further retribution, since the people were now peaceful and it might serve
51 AM Troyes, Fonds Boutiot, A 22, 12 July 1586.
52 Ibid., 5 July 1586: ‘admonester le peuple a` leurs presches et predications qu’il ayt a` se
contenir sans bruit, ne commettre insolences ny s’esmouvoyr’.
53 Ibid., 12 July 1586: ‘l’une des plus grandes faultes qui se fust remarque´e avoyt este´ de ce
que les habitans d’icelle s’estoyent montrez fort froids a` obeyr aux mandemens qui leurs
avoyent este´ faictz par les ofﬁciers du Roy . . . qu’il estoit de besoing et a` l’advenir y donner
ordre et adviser sur les moyens propres que l’on debvroit tenir aﬁn que tel inconvenient
advenant on y puisse remedier sur le champ et promptement estaindre le feu avant qu’il
fust embrase´’.
54 Beik, Urban Protest, 85–90, discusses the anti-ﬁscal revolts of 1625–26 in Troyes, during
which the inaction of the local militia rendered the authorities impotent.
55 BN, MS fr. 17990, fo. 108, 10 July: ‘mettre en totalle ruyne l’une des bonnes villes de son
royaulme’, using a combination of ﬂattery and threat characteristic of royal responses
to acts of disobedience, see Finley-Croswhite, Henry IV and the Towns, 9–10, 147–51. Cf.
the view of Mark W. Konnert, Local Politics in the French Wars of Religion: The Towns of
Champagne, the Duc de Guise, and the Catholic League, 1560–95 (Aldershot, 2006), 187–9, who
sees Henry III’s heavy-handed approach on this occasion as alienating royal support.
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to reignite rather than to deter further trouble. Henry relented, in a further
letter of 22 July, on condition that they continued their exhortations to the
people to remain quiet and obedient and refrain from further insolence
towards their sovereign: ‘that the ill advised among their fellow citizens
take care never to return to the same faults, but to always show due
reverence and obedience to our commands’.56
Nevertheless, it still seems curious that the unrest, thatwas after all small
scale, short lived and swiftly crushed, received such attention at court. The
king clearly took the incident very personally indeed, but his anger went
well beyond the snub of a gift to his sister, for at that time he had no less
than 27 ﬁscal edicts before the Paris Parlement. These had already aroused
vociferousprotests in the capital, and itwouldnot have aidedhis cause, nor
improved his humour, to receive news of opposition to an existing levy.57
It was also the case that this demand had ﬁrst been made over six years
before, with the legislation intensifying month by month from December
1585, revealing the extent of royal frustrationwith trying to enforce the tax.
When coercion and commands to mastercraftsmen and local authorities to
take charge failed to produce a result, an extraordinary commission was
brought in, never a popular move.58 In addition, this was the reaction of
a monarch who felt politically weak and exposed, especially when faced
with dissent in one of themajor cities susceptible to League inﬂuence, since
the duke of Guise was governor of Champagne. From the crown’s point
of view such disturbances, which could be construed as overt opposition
to the royal will, took on a more sinister aspect at a time of organized
anti-royal activity. Nevertheless, the king’s handling of the situation was
perfectly in keeping with that of his predecessors and successors who,
when faced with urban dissent, ‘tended to operate between the poles of
paternalistic forgiveness and vengeful chastisement’.59
Norwas the reaction in the capital conﬁned to a vigorous royal response.
The journal of a Parisian resident, Pierre de L’Estoile, reports the incident
(notable principally, according to him, for the excessive force used by the
commissioners) alongside other similar outbursts of popular discontent
at the increasing burden of royal taxation.60 Some historians have seen
56 AM Troyes, Fonds Boutiot, A 22, 5, 8 and 12 July; AA 31, liasse 1, 3 Aug. BN, MS fr. 17990,
fo. 108, 10 July; Fonds Dupuy, MS 228, fo. 235r, 22 July: ‘que les maladvisez de leurs
concitoyens se preignent garde de ne tomber jamais en semblables faultes, ains de porter
tousjours la reverance et obeyssance qu’ilz doibvent a noz commandemens’.
57 Dare, 56. R.J. Knecht, The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France (London, 1996), 518.
58 See Actes royaux, BN, Imprime´s, F 46880, nos. 29 and 31, F 46881, nos. 9 (9 Jan., commission
to levy by constraint), 17 (12 Feb., announced that it was ‘expressement deffendu a` toutes
personnes de troubler & empescher a` l’execution desdites commissions & contrainctes’),
and 31 (19 Mar., ‘ce a` cause des intelligences qui sont entre noz juges et ofﬁciers, avec les
habitans des villes s’il ne leur est plus estroictement enjoint t’assister’).
59 Finley-Croswhite, Henry IV and the Towns, 147.
60 Registre-journal, vol. V, 190. In an otherwise well-informed account, L’Estoile incorrectly
cites ‘un argentier’ (a silversmith) in place of Largentier. On other contemporary revolts
in Beauvais and Normandy, see Crouzet, Les guerriers de dieu, vol. II, 267 and nn. 125–6
(280–1).
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these anti-ﬁscal revolts of the 1580s and 1590s in terms of recruitment to
the Catholic League and thus in opposition to the kingship of Henry III, a
view which would conﬁrm the fears of the crown. It is suggested that the
League manipulated public opinion by taking advantage of the people’s
grievances and hardship to undermine the position of the monarchy and
to enhance their own support.61 Yet this is too simplistic a picture of the
workings of sixteenth-century urban politics at a provincial level, which
involved the defence of local interests against the ﬁscal demands of the
crown whatever the allegiance of the individual, as demonstrated by the
actions of the unwaveringly Royalist Dinteville, in response to impending
subsistence crisis in both 1585 and 1587.62 However, the crown feared that
popular protests, particularly those aimed against aspects of royal policy,
were indicative of a groundswell of support for the League. Nevertheless,
League leaders no more than municipal authorities could rely on social
unrest working to their advantage; the outcomes were too unpredictable.
It is unclear whether the participants in the revolts of 1586, or those
in general dissatisﬁed with exorbitant royal levies, were attracted by
the League. It is notable that the tax farmer, Largentier, was among
those excluded from ofﬁce and then expelled from the city as a Royalist
in 1589. Other targets of the protestors who would later prove to be
ardent supporters of the crown included Louis Le Mairat, re-elected
as mayor following Troyes’ submission to Henry IV in 1594, and clerk
Antoine de Vienne. Nevertheless, the property of staunch Leaguers was
also attacked, notably the houses of Nicolas Domino and Nicolas Le
Marguenat, later to sit on the local League council. Nor, indeed, would
such allegiances necessarily have been so evident to the people at this
stage. Those municipal ofﬁcials responsible for dealing with the unrest
were also split ideologically by the League coup in 1588: Nicolas Dare was
himself to become a League councillor, whilst Nicolas Jaquot was arrested
and expelled for being a Royalist.63 Dare certainly appears to have been
sympathetic with the rebels’ grievances, but he was no less eager than
his Royalist colleagues to ingratiate himself with the crown following the
disturbances; the time had not yet come for open deﬁance of the king.
Political allegiances at this point, then, remained uncertain. Doubtless
some local ofﬁcials felt unsettled by the suggestion of monarchical
weakness and corruption contained in the League-sponsored political
pamphletry to which they were increasingly exposed. Nor should we
discount their apparent prevarication in the face of popular unrest,
61 See, for example, Crouzet, Les guerriers de dieu, vol. II, 267; cf. Farr, Hands of Honor, 198.
On both the problems of manipulating popular support and the role of the Guise faction
in the 1580s, see Stuart Carroll, ‘The Guise afﬁnity and popular protest during the wars of
religion’, French History, 9 (1995), 125–52.
62 AMTroyes, Fonds Boutiot, AA 31, liasse 1, 28Oct. 1586; ‘Lettres deMonsieur deDinteville’,
61–2.
63 On the League/Royalist divisions in Troyes, see Roberts, A City in Conﬂict, 173–83; and
most recently, Konnert, Local Politics.
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which may suggest a degree of dissatisfaction with crown policy and a
willingness to give a platform to discontent. Although the protestors, too,
were susceptible to anti-regime propaganda at a time of crisis, just how
this translated into action is more difﬁcult to gauge. More signiﬁcant may
be the absence of a confessional dimension to the unrest, seen elsewhere as
a direct link to sympathies with the League, despite Troyes’ long history
of conﬂict between the faiths.64 All the evidence suggests that for the
participants in the revolts, economic concerns far outweighed the political
and confessional struggles being waged at a national and local level, as
indeed economic issues were foremost in the minds of the third estate
in Troyes when the League sought to woo supporters to its cause in the
1570s. The deputies responded by setting down preconditions: the more
even distribution of the ﬁscal burden, keeping down the cost of troops and
ensuring that ofﬁcials and captains fulﬁl their duties.65 Whatever game the
authorities may have been playing in 1586 in their ambivalence over the
justice of the protestors’ cause, there were more reliable means by which
both sides could gain or retain inﬂuence in Troyes than through winning
popular support.
Both before and after the revolts, crown/League conﬂict was evident
in the municipal politics of Troyes, with both sides exerting all means
at their disposal, including bribery and the pulpit, to ensure the election
of their own candidates to the principal ofﬁces of mayor and e´chevins.
This was the case in both 1586 and 1587, when the king selected from
a short-list submitted by the authorities.66 But from 1588 to 1594, when
the League had control in Troyes, their supporters were elevated and
pro-Royalist opponents expelled. The disloyalty of many of the principal
French towns during this period of League ascendancy, a reﬂection of
the still considerable potential of municipal autonomy to undermine
royal authority, was a lesson not lost on the crown. It is not surprising,
therefore, that once the crown was in a powerful enough position to do
so in the seventeenth century, independent control of municipal defences
and ﬁnances were curbed.67 Intervention in municipal elections to senior
posts was also exploited, both to secure malleable local ofﬁcials and as
a means to raise revenue. The local authorities could still expect to be
severely reprimanded, and suspicion cast on their loyalties, as a result of
64 The confessional element in other revolts is emphasized, for instance, by Finley-Croswhite,
Henry IV and the Towns, 152–3, and Farr, Hands of Honor, 198; Le Roy Ladurie, Carnaval de
Romans, 95–102. The confessional conﬂict in Troyes is explored extensively in Roberts, A
City in Conﬂict.
65 AM Troyes, Fonds Boutiot, BB 14, liasse 2, no. 62; BN, Fonds Dupuy, MS 87, fo. 99.
66 Dare, 48–9 and 64–6; Bonjour, 66. Bibliothe`que de l’Arsenal, Paris, MS 4254, fos. 149–50.
The franchise was more limited in Troyes than, for instance, in Dijon, and the rigging of
elections therefore involved less need to ingratiate candidates with the people.
67 Nora Temple, ‘The control and exploitation of French towns during the ancien regime’, in
R.F. Kierstead (ed.), State and Society in Seventeenth-Century France (New York, 1975), 67–93.
On continuing interference in municipal elections under Henry IV, see Finley-Croswhite,
‘Absolutism and municipal autonomy’.
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popular unrest within their jurisdiction, if it was deemed by the crown not
to have been suppressed swiftly enough. By the same token, the crown
took advantage of the opportunity provided by such events to reduce the
independence of action of local ofﬁcials, as well as to impose a hefty ﬁne,
a trend already well established in the sixteenth century.68
It is argued that it was under Henry II (1547–59) in the 1550s that
urban autonomy was ﬁrst seriously attacked by the crown, in the drive to
ﬁnance the escalating costs of military ventures. However, since at least
the mid-ﬁfteenth century there had been efforts to retain the loyalties
of the so-called bonnes villes by keeping a tight rein on those seen to be
resisting royal policy.69 The peculiar circumstances of the religious wars
of the mid- to late sixteenth century provided a further opportunity for
towns to organize their own defences and administration in the provinces
sometimes in deﬁance of the crown, and demonstrated to the monarchy
the extent to which municipal autonomy could obstruct the extension of
royal authority. Yet the period also witnessed the continuing dialogue
between the crown and its municipal elites, with royal intervention in
elections usually serving simply to uphold the local choice of candidate.70
At the same time, relations between municipal and royal authorities were
peripheral to the grievances of the participants in the unrest in Troyes
in 1586, who by their actions were continuing a tradition of revolt that
had little to do with either struggles for power on a national level or
local factional disputes. For them, of much more pressing concern was
the imminent subsistence crisis compounded by increasing and seemingly
arbitrary ﬁscal demands on their already overstretched resources. Neither
royal nor League policies would succeed in easing these burdens, and the
situation was far too volatile for either side to be conﬁdent of channelling
this discontent for their own political purposes. Ultimately, only peace
could bring the relief that the craftsmen of Troyes sought through revolt.
The signiﬁcance of an incident such as the revolts in Troyes in the
summer of 1586 reach far beyond the local tensions and grievances
which provoked the discontent. On the one hand, it demonstrates the
ability of townspeople to organize an effective protest which forced the
authorities to take notice and to alter their approach accordingly. On the
other, it underlines the continuing authority of the crown which could
bring pressure to bear on, and make answerable, its representatives in
the provincial towns of France. Whereas Hilary Bernstein contrasts the
forceful conduct of Henry IV towards Poitiers with the apparently weak
approach of his predecessor, Henry III, the reaction of the crown to events
68 L. Bernard, ‘French society and popular uprisings under Louis XIV’, in Kierstead (ed.),
State and Society, 157–79.
69 B. Chevalier, Les bonnes villes de France du XIVe au XVIe sie`cle (Paris, 1982), with Louis XI
(1461–83), the ﬁrst monarch to establish the right to elect a mayor from three candidates
submitted by the municipality of Troyes, 204. D. Potter, A History of France, 1460–1560
(London, 1995), 156–63.
70 See Finley-Croswhite, Henry IV and the Towns, 7–10.
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in Troyes in 1586 suggests that an assertive stance was more customary at
least prior to the royal nadir of 1588–89.71 It is certain that early modern
urban politics involved negotiation and compromise, ‘within the context
of traditional power relations’.72 Equally, it is clear thatmutual distrust and
fear existed between social groups, placing strain on community solidarity.
Whilst the collective expression of grievances could be seen as an accepted
part of the political process for the disenfranchised, violence and threats
to people and property were not. An overt challenge to royal policy, and
therefore authority, was the least palatable of all and provoked a decisive
response. Nevertheless, the popular voice could not be wholly ignored
once it had spoken, and early modern municipal elites were sensitive to
the balance that needed to be struck between themaintenance of order and
the suppression of disorder. At the height of the religious wars this was
an important lesson to be heeded by both sides, but one that was learned
through a long tradition of urban protest and demonstration that would
continue long after the national conﬂict was over.
71 Bernstein, Crown and Community, 261. See on this point, Finley-Croswhite, Henry IV and
the Towns, 1, 5, 182–6.
72 Beik, Urban Protest, 264.
